Headmaster of King Edward's School in Birmingham for fourteen years, Edwin Hamilton Gifford also held a number of ecclesiastical posts, including select preacher at both Cambridge and Oxford. Better known for his biblical and patristic scholarship, he also prepared this edition of the Euthydemus, Plato's most comical dialogue. Thought to be an early work, depicting a discussion between Socrates and two sophists trained in eristic, it is among the earliest-known treatises on logic, satirising various fallacies that were (...) subsequently categorised by Aristotle. Published in 1905, a generation after Jowett's standard translation, this edition was intended for university and advanced school students. A thorough introduction is given in English, followed by the Greek text, extensive notes, and indexes of vocabulary and names. As such, this reissue illuminates the educational preoccupations of both early twentieth-century England and classical Athens. (shrink)

As the expansion of the Internet and the digital formatting of all kinds of creative works move us further into the information age, intellectual property issues have become paramount. Computer programs costing thousands of research dollars are now copied in an instant. People who would recoil at the thought of stealing cars, computers, or VCRs regularly steal software or copy their favorite music from a friend's CD. Since the Web has no national boundaries, these issues are international concerns. The contributors-philosophers, (...) legal theorists, and business scholars, among others-address questions such as: Can abstract ideas be owned? How does the violation of intellectual property rights compare to the violation of physical property rights? Can computer software and other digital information be protected? And how should legal systems accommodate the ownership of intellectual property in an information age? Intellectual Property is a lively examination of these and other issues, and an invaluable resource for librarians, lawyers, businesspeople, and scholars. (shrink)

WHEN THE FIRST GIFFORD LECTURES were delivered in Scotland in 1888-89, the Scottish philosophical and theological worlds were undergoing significant changes. Through much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain, natural theology referred to the traditional arguments for the existence of God, particularly as put forth in the work of William Paley. But developments in the empirical sciences and in the empirical type of philosophy which dominated British thought during this period challenged these arguments and led to widespread (...) religious skepticism. Thomas Reid and William Hamilton were two Scots who had sought to overcome the religious skepticism of the empirical age, but the appeal to common sense belief on the one hand and to an unknowable absolute on the other hand provided little comfort for many who were dissatisfied with the options of religious scepticism and doctrinal orthodoxy. A new philosophical spirit, however, was making itself known. This is suggested in a note to the 1877 edition of David Masson's Recent British Philosophy, first published in 1865. (shrink)

Everybody knows that humans are cultural animals. Although this fact is universally acknowledged, many opportunities to exploit it are overlooked. In this article, I propose shifting our attention from local examples of extended mind to the cultural-cognitive ecosystems within which human cognition is embedded. I conclude by offering a set of conjectures about the features of cultural-cognitive ecosystems.

THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS CHAPTER I THE RENAISSANCE OF LOGIC WITHIN the last two decades the scholarly world has witnessed a revival of interest in logic ...

It may be nearly impossible to use standard principles to make a decision about a complex ethical case. The best decision, say virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition, is often one that is made by a person of good character who knows the salient facts of the case and can frame the situation appropriately. In this respect ethical decisions and strategic decisions are similar. Rationality plays a role in good ethical decision-making, but virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of intuitions and (...) emotions as well.Virtue ethics suggests a reconciliation of the factual and the normative. Virtues may explain as well as justify actions. The same is true of other psychological states and events. That psychological terms have normative implications does not render them useless in explanation. As Aristotle does not distinguish cleanly between the normative and empirical, so many moral philosophers today reject the is-ought dichotomy. They are prepared to learn from economists, psychologists, and other empirical scientists who offer information about the nature of the good life and of values. Social psychologists who study community or corporate culture suggest a close relationship between organizational and ethical features, much as Aristotle saw a close relationship between politics and ethics. We should infer from all this that in business ethics there is good reason for philosophers and organization scholars to work closely together. (shrink)

This essay addresses directions for the Social Issues in Management (SIM) Division from the perspective of “Back to the Future.” The author was chair of the SIM Division in 1983 to 1984 and the 1989 recipient of the SIM Division’s Sumner Marcus Distinguished Service Award. The essay reviews the general history of SIM during the 1960s and 1970s in which the University of California, Berkeley, played a key role in organizing conferences. The author explains his approach as an applied empiricist (...) to research concerning SIM. The essentials are power, legitimacy, responsibility, rationality, and values, and understanding how they impact the ongoing day-to-day interactions within, between, and among business organizations, their leadership, and other sectors of society. SIM is a field of diverse inquiry which has been the recipient of perspectives and persons drawn not only from multiple disciplines, particularly from the social sciences, law, and management, but also from the humanities and sciences. SIM is patently multi- and inter-disciplinary. (shrink)

Abstract:Phillips and Margolis argue that moral philosophy is a poor basis for business ethics, but their narrow view of moral philosophy would exclude Aristotle, for one. They criticize me for assimilating states and organizations in using the Rawlsian device, but they put too much faith in Rawls’s distinction between states and voluntary organizations and pay too little attention to the continuities between them. Their plea for a conceptually autonomous ethics for organizations I interpret as reasonable and largely compatible with my (...) own stated opinion. (shrink)

Using the history of political thought and real-world political contexts, including South Africa and the recent global financial crisis, this book argues that power is integral to freedom. It demonstrates how freedom depends upon power, and contends that liberty for all citizens is best maintained if conceived as power through political representation. Against those who de-politicise freedom through a romantic conception of 'the people' and faith in supposedly independent judicial and political institutions, Lawrence Hamilton argues that real modern freedom (...) can only be achieved through representative and participative mechanisms that limit domination and empower classes and groups who become disempowered in the conflicts that inevitably pervade politics. This is a sophisticated contribution to contemporary political theory that will be of interest to scholars and students of history, politics, philosophy, economics, sociology, development studies and Southern African studies. (shrink)

Leadership and folIowership are unified in an interdependent relationship exemplified by the idea of teamwork. Ethical concems are among the valuational elements essential to developing loyalty and trust in this relationship. However, because of their need to maintain power and distance, self-serving leaders may become detached from how their actions are perceived and reacted to by followers. This pattern can be especially damaging to teamwork when leaders continue to receive disprortionate rewards despite their poor performance, especially when coupled with organizational (...) downsizing and layoffs. Implications are drawn regarding the ethics of equity, responsibility, and accountability in the exercise of authority and power. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Behaviorism is consistent with the assumptions of perfect competition, with the homo economicus model, and with a form of ethics that enshrines market-based notions of utility, justice, and rights and encourages rational maximizing. Economics and business courses foster this deficient form of ethics, assuming an overriding desire for money, which, according to MacIntyre and Aristotle, crowds out the associative virtues. These beliefs, often associated with Taylor and Friedman, lead to such practices as incentive compensation, which would be effective only if (...) employees were homines economici and thus rational in the sense of knowing how to satisfy whatever desires they have. Against Davidson’s view that psychology cannot be a natural science, Aristotle believes that there can be a teleological, if not exact, science of behavior. Aristotle believes that emotions and objectives may be rational or irrational. But rationality—phronesis, practical wisdom—is not a matter of applying algorithms. Doris questions whether character generates the first premises of an agent’s practical syllogisms, while Haidt has argued that we often act on emotions rather than on the basis of the reasons that we claim motivate us. Aristotle agrees that many people are not virtuous and that weakness of the will is a common occurrence, and he agrees that emotion drives actions. But if you are virtuous, your emotions and desires support your rationality. Aristotle gives us reason to reject the notion that people are homines economici and to treat them as rational deliberators, in part by creating an appropriate culture. The claim that it is in the nature of human beings to deliberate rationally is in part aspirational, but also in part scientific—in Aristotle’s modest sense. (shrink)

Of course, the rationale of PME is so different from what has been taught in “orthodox” statistics courses for fifty years, that it causes conceptual hangups for many with conventional training. But beginning students have no difficulty with it, for it is just a mathematical model of the natural, common sense way in which anybody does conduct his inferences in problems of everyday life.The difficulties that seem so prominent in the literature today are, therefore, only transient phenomena that will disappear (...) automatically in time. Indeed, this revolution in our attitude toward inference is already an accomplished fact among those concerned with a few specialized applications; with a little familarity in its use its advantages are apparent and it no longer seems strange. It is the idea that inference was once thought to be tied to frequencies in random experiments, that will seem strange to future generations. (shrink)

Abstract:We have reached a rough moral consensus in the field of business ethics. We believe in capitalism with a safety net and enough regulation to deal with serious market imperfections. We favor autonomy for individuals and democracy for governments, though not necessarily for organizations. We recognize the rights of citizens and the different rights of employees. We respect a variety of possible sets of values, and so countenance a distinction between public and private. In other words, we are capitalists, pluralists, (...) and liberals. But globalization will force us and businesspeople who share our views to deal with significant stakeholders who do not. The 21st century will see the accelerating pace of globalization. The great challenge for business ethics, for its philosophers and its scholars of business, will be to identify and advocate morality that takes adequate account of globalization, and that in so doing avoids untenable parochialism without falling into relativism. (shrink)

Institutional investors are increasingly becoming active owners through voting their shares and engaging in dialogue with investee companies to improve corporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance. This article applies a model of stakeholder salience to the shareholder context, analysing the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, to determine the factors that are likely to enhance shareholder salience. It is found that a strong business case and the values of the managers of investee companies are likely to be the (...) most important contributors to shareholder salience. (shrink)

Christopher McMahon links political theory and business ethics and thereby takes the latter to a new level of philosophical sophistication. McMahon argues that legitimate authority, political or managerial, characteristically preempts certain of one’s judgments, so that one may reasonably submit to a directive to do something that contravenes one’s principles. Authoritative preemption does not involve weighing reasons pro and con, as one who is considering breaking a promise must do: it disqualifies competing considerations.

The notion that there exists a fundamental need to exert control over or to influence one’s environment has enjoyed a long history in psychology (e.g., DeCharms, 1968; Heider, 1958) and has stimulated considerable theoretical work. Such a need has been characterized by theorists at multiple levels of analysis. Control motivation, for example, has been characterized broadly in terms of proactive (White, 1959) or reactive (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) strivings for control over general (...) or specific (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and central or peripheral outcomes (Thompson, 1993). Additionally, various types of control strategies used to gain or maintain a sense of personal control have been proposed (e.g., Averill, 1973; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Thompson, 1981). Modes of control, for instance, have been categorized as either primary or secondary. Primary strategies involve direct action undertaken to produce desirable and avoid undesirable outcomes in the external world, whereas secondary strategies employ primarily cognitive processes undertaken to produce a change within the person. Recently, Heckhausen and Schulz (1995) have further delineated these primary and secondary forms of control according to whether they are based on veridical or illusory causal understandings of the world and whether they are functional or dysfunctional. While most control theorists view primary control as preferable to secondary control, the latter is viewed as critical in the process of adaptation to control failures and in the promotion of future primary control attempts. (shrink)

A biography of the seventeenth-century French mathematician and philosopher whose revolutionary methods of reasoning greatly influenced future scientific thinking.

This paper starts with an intuitive notion of representational spaces, which is intended to provide an improved version of Kuhn's concept of paradigms. It then proceeds to study the following topics in terms of this new notion: incommensurability, paradigm change, explanation of anomalies, explanation of regularities, explanation of irregularities, and physical necessity. In the course of the investigation, "representational space" gets clarified and defined. It is envisaged that this new concept should throw light on many issues in the philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

Hamilton shows how awareness of the uses of space -- in particular uses of space in which to stage an event of any kind -- enable spectators to pick out characters, props, and the like across performances within production runs, across production runs, and even across productions employing different scripts. The key ideas of object identification are taken both from the philosophical and the empirical literature and are treated as epistemic ideas rather than metaphysical conceptions.

"The problem of good conduct, both in practice and in ethical theory, ought to receive some clarification, one would suppose, from a science that studies the mind and the will in their actual operation. If in the past psychology has not materially contributed to this problem, it is possibly owing to the incompetence of psychology to tell us much that is either true or useful about the essential nature of mind or will, or of the soul. I believe that such (...) has been the case, and that now for the first time, and largely owing to the insight of Dr. Sigmund Freud, a view of the will has been gained which can be of real service to ethics. In presenting this I shall disregard the current comments on Freud, which have become so familiar, for he deserves neither the furious dispraise nor the frantic worship which have been accorded him. He is a man of genius, simply, more sagacious and more perspicacious than his detractors and far more sane than many of his followers. Freud's contribution to science is notable, and in my opinion epoch-making, for a reason which has hardly ever been mentioned. And this reason is that he has given to the science of mind a 'causal category': or, to put it less academically, he has given us a key to the explanation of mind. This key to the mind, which Freud calls the 'wish, ' is the subject of the present volume. And we shall consider more particularly the bearing which this wish-psychology may have on ethics"--Preface, p. v. (shrink)

In scientific explanations, the explanans theory is sometimes incommensurable with the explanandum empirical data. How is this possible, especially when the explanation is deductive in nature? This paper attempts to solve the puzzle without relying on any particular theory of reference. For us, it is rather obvious that the geometric idea of projection plays a key role in Keplers explanation of Tycho Brahes empirical data. We discover that a similar mechanism operates in theoretic explanations in general. In short, all theoretic (...) explanations are projective explanations. If so, there should be no logical reason why explanans theories cannot be incommensurable with explanandum data. For illustration, we analyse Einsteins explanation of the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment in some detail. (shrink)

What is the status and nature of the “it” and the ontological progression from an “it” to an “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative conception of a person? In this article, I attempt to preliminarily give some nuance content to the “it” of childhood and the “it” of the nameless dead. My motivation is straightforwardly simple: to defend Menkiti’s claim that both “its” have some depersonalised moral standing or existence. However, in doing so, I argue that a better account of the (...) ontological progression of personhood is from an “it” to an “it-it” 1 rather than from an “it” to an “it.” On this modified version of the double hyphenated “its”, which is underpinned by the idea of moral force, the prior moral worth of the nameless dead is taken into account as valuable members of our collective immortality, notwithstanding the fact that their names have been forgotten. Keywords: African Philosophy, Collective Immortality, Menkiti, It, It-it, Moral Force, Nameless Dead, Personhood. (shrink)

In analyzing S0009838800019480_inline1 for composition I start in the most obvious way with S0009838800019480_inline2 in the sense of ‘gang’ , while S0009838800019480_inline3 must be a root-noun from *lew-s, and is perhaps immediately cognate with Skr. lu-nati ‘caedit.’1 This analysis makes S0009838800019480_inline4 mean something like ‘ uiam-muniens,’ i.e. a sort of ‘ ponti-fex.’ I think more particularly of the sacrificial leader, the S0009838800019480_inline5, the Rex Sacrificulus, who, while he may have been concerned with the making of ways on earth, also made (...) paths for man to the gods. But this aside, he who ‘ blazed the trail,’ who ‘ loosed’ or ‘ solved ’ the ‘ ways,’ was ‘ explorer, guide, leader,’ i.e. ‘dux.’. (shrink)

I. Latin interpres, miles etc. and the confix -et-, ‘errans,’ cf. -etum ‘allee.’In Am. Jr. Phil. 28, 413 I derived the suffix in Gothic fram-aps ‘alienus’, Latin com-et- ‘socius– and Greek τ ‘comites’ from the root et- ‘errare, ire’; and I proposed the name ‘confix’ for a suffix whose origin could be traced back to an original compounding element. I now find further evidence for the confix -et- in Latin interpret-, ‘go-between’; and I explain pr-et- as a fusion-product of the (...) synonymous roots PER- and ET- ‘errare, ire’. Nor is this explanation in conflict with the current comparison between interpres and Gothic frops ‘klug, verstandig’: it is simply that ‘go-between’ is nearer the meaning. The wisdom attributed to the wanderer, to the traveller in far lands,–an idea forever embalmed for English folk in Shakespeare's counter-turn. (shrink)

In the school study of syntax the results of etymology, however highly they may be valued in theory, are in effect neglected. I called attention to this, and specifically to the construction of credo with the dative, in an article in the Classical Quarterly, v. 193.